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Abstract: Many studies state that favourable accounting treatment has been one of the
main reasons firms issue employee stock options. However, stock options have recently received growing criticism with a possible effect on incentive effectiveness and outrage costs.
The main purpose of this study is to explore the impacts of IFRS 2 and the recent financial
crisis on stock option compensation. Empirical evidence suggests that (i) IFRS 2 did not
have a significant effect on the granting of stock options, and (ii) the issue of stock options
is less likely to occur during a financial crisis.
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1. Introduction
In the last decade, stock option plans (hereafter SOPs) have generated considerable interest
among academic researchers, government regulators, business, and the popular press.
The topic has fascinated accounting scholars, who have devoted their efforts to exploring
possible determinants of SOP adoption and the actual effects of this form of incentive.
Among the factors often associated with the issue of SOPs, favorable accounting treatment
has been cited in many studies, thus highlighting the low perceived cost of stock options
(Hall & Murphy, 2003; Murphy, 2002; Murphy, 2003; Muurling & Lehnert, 2004).
The recognition of SOPs required by IFRS 2 is the outcome of increasing pressure and
a long debate on the need for this form of incentive to be more transparent (Ferri &
Sandino, 2009; Guay, Kothari, & Sloan, 2003; Hall & Murphy, 2003). Such recognition
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has radically changed the accounting treatment of SOPs within European listed firms.
Further, before mandatory recognition, many companies (especially high-tech ones)
expressed serious concerns about the significant negative impact of SOPs on their financial
accounts (Chalmers & Godfrey, 2005); consequently, their lobbies firmly opposed the
new accounting treatment (see Cheng & Smith, 2013; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996;
Koh, 2011; Zeff, 2002 for the U.S. perspective and Subramaniam and Tsay, 2012 for the
Canadian perspective). Therefore, studying the impact of IFRS 2 on the issuing of SOPs,
and investigating whether the reaction to mandatory cost recognition has resulted in a
reduction of this practice, are understandably interesting. In this context, it is useful to
recall that prior research suggests recognized financial items can attract more investor
attention than items simply disclosed in footnotes (Espahbodi et al., 2002; Frederickson,
Hodge, & Pratt, 2006).
In order to explore the key determinants of SOPs in recent years, it is worth noting that
this kind of incentive is connected to political costs and that SOPs have also been the
target of growing criticism, especially when the global financial crisis started to affect the
real economy. They may therefore have a significant impact on incentive effectiveness and
outrage costs, both of which can limit stock options (Murphy, 2002).
The present study aims to investigate the impact of IFRS 2 and of the financial crisis on
the issuing of SOPs. Additionally, we consider determinants derived from stock option
literature, with particular reference to incentive alignment, financial constraints, and tax
benefits, all of which have proved to have relevant explanatory power for the issuing of
SOPs.
The analysis is carried out on the entire population of Italian listed companies over the
years 2000-2009. Thus, the time horizon extends over 10 years: the five years before IFRS
adoption, and the five years with IFRS-compliant financial statements. We have taken this
approach because many SOPs adopted by listed companies include more than one issue of
stock options (hence they last for more than one year). We can therefore show the impact
on SOPs more accurately by using such an extended time horizon.
In the aforementioned context, Italy is particularly interesting for several reasons. First,
the diffusion of Italian stock options seems largely dependent on external factors, as the
growth of stock option plans in 1994-1996 (mainly owing to favorable fiscal treatment)
demonstrates (Di Pietra & Riccaboni, 2001). Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that less
favorable accounting treatment could also affect corporate behavior. Second, before IFRS
2 the accounting treatment of SOPs in Italy was limited to the disclosure of quantitative
information about the number of stock options and their variations during the year, without
any data about their fair value. This approach differs significantly from the 1993 version
of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 123 that requires disclosure of
stock-based compensation costs, thereby encouraging their recognition. In such a scenario,
IFRS 2 represents a radical change: from total absence of value information (not even in
footnotes) to recognition of SOPs in the P&L account and detailed additional disclosure.
Further, Italy is one of the few EU countries where the adoption of IFRS is mandatory for
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the consolidated and individual accounts of listed companies (none of which have opted
for preliminary voluntary transition), while other countries limit the application of the
rules of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to consolidated financial
statements only. This may imply IFRS 2’s stronger influence on corporate practices.
We find that the new accounting treatment that the adoption of IFRS 2 provided did not
result in fewer firms issuing SOPs, despite the robust opposition of listed companies to
mandatory recognition. In addition, in line with our predictions, empirical evidence
suggests that a financial crisis reduces the probability of firms issuing stock options.
Our results contribute to the literature with both theoretical and policy implications.
First, they increase our understanding of determinants of SOPs granting by considering
several accounting and economic determinants, thereby increasing our understanding of
SOP determinants. Our study also explores the effect of IFRS 2 in terms of real earnings
management by analyzing the impact of the standard on firms’ practices, thus providing
useful evidence to standard setters.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The prior literature is discussed in
section 2. Section 3 develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 describes the research
method employed, and section 5 presents the results of the empirical tests. The last section
provides conclusions.
2. Review of the Literature
The issuing of SOPs and the motivations behind such decisions have been widely researched
from various perspectives. Prior literature has developed several hypotheses that have led
to mixed evidence: (a) alignment of interests, (b) rent extraction, (c) personnel retention,
(d) tax benefits, and (e) perceived cost.
The agency theory approach analyses the use of SOPs as a form of compensation and
incentive, aligning the interests of managers and shareholders (Fama, 1980; Jensen &
Murphy, 1990a; Jensen & Murphy, 1990b). In this regard, optimal contracting theory
suggests that SOPs can reduce agency problems by combining managers’ and shareholders’
objectives. From such a perspective, SOPs mitigate risk-related incentive problems,
encouraging managers to focus less on reporting short-term accounting profits and more
on long-term profitability, thereby increasing their compensation packages. Empirical
studies test this hypothesis by considering either the effect of SOPs (Agrawal & Mandelker,
1987; Morgan & Poulsen, 2001) or the corporate characteristics that are consistent with
the proposed view such as a firm’s Tobin’s q (Frye, 2004; Kedia & Mozumdar, 2002; Khan,
Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2005; Yermack, 1995).
A second interesting stream of research deals with managers’ exploitation of stock options
as a legal tool in order to subtract wealth from a company. This ”rent extraction” perspective
(Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002; Hanlon, Rajgopal, & Shevlin, 2003; Melis, Carta, & Gaia,
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2011) stems from the combined effect of the impressive amounts of options granted in
some large U.S. corporations and the growing demand for fair corporate governance
rules. Such a managerial power approach is based on the idea that boards do not operate
at arm’s length when devising executive compensation arrangements; rather, they have
power to influence their own pay and use this power to extract rents. Further, the desire to
camouflage such behavior could lead to the use of inefficient compensation packages that
provide suboptimal incentives and thereby hurt shareholder value.
Another reason for issuing SOPs that has received considerable attention from prior
literature (even though only a few empirical studies have explored it) regards the benefits
of personnel policies. SOPs can be a particularly useful tool to attract and retain key
personnel (Arya & Mittendorf, 2005; Balsam & Miharjo, 2007; Ittner, Lambert, & Larcker,
2003; Kedia & Mozumdar, 2002; Oyer, 2000; Oyer & Schaefer, 2005), an advantage that is
twofold. First, young and start-up companies are able to hire managers by offering them
compensation that relies more on growth prospects than high cash salaries. Second, this
kind of incentive can play a screening or sorting role because talented and less risk-adverse
employees will find option-based contracts more attractive.
A significant amount of prior literature also focuses on tax benefits provided by stock
options. Depending on national rules and the design of SOPs, this form of compensation
can lead to considerable corporate tax and/or executive income tax savings. Empirical
studies suggest that the tax component is essential in understanding the SOPs phenomenon
(Aboody & Kasznik, 2008; Ciccotello, Grant, & Grant, 2004; Hite & Long, 1982, Klassen &
Mawani, 2000; Zattoni & Minichilli, 2009)
The perceived cost view (Murphy, 2002) takes into account two relevant benefits of SOPs.
The first enables a firm to obtain the advantages associated with SOPs without requiring
cash outflows, thus providing a useful tool for companies that face cash constraints (Core
& Guay, 2001; Kedia & Mozumdar, 2002; Matsunaga, Shevlin, & Shores, 1992; Yermack,
1995;). The second refers to the accounting explanation for stock option widespread
diffusion (Carter, Lynch, & Tuna, 2007; Hall & Murphy, 2002; Muurling & Lehnert, 2004),
a stream of research based on the idea that disclosure is not a substitute for recognition
(Espahbodi, 2002; Frederickson, Hodge, & Pratt, 2006). This is consistent with findings
from U.S. studies showing that firms voluntarily recognizing stock option expenses (under
SFAS 123) have significantly lower expenses than other firms (Aboody, Barth, & Kasznik,
2004).
Using a similar perspective, other studies focus on the link between stock options and
earnings management. Matsunaga (1995) tests two hypotheses about the financial costs
related to SOPs. The first concerns the relationship between the issuing of incentive
share-based plans and the adoption of accounting policies that aim to boost profits (e.g.,
FIFO instead of LIFO, and faster amortization criteria). The second hypothesis deals
with achieving established target profits. Results suggest a relationship between the
issuing of stock option plans and earnings management, a connection that has also been
hypothesized by Cheng and Warfield (2005). They find a positive relationship between
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the amount of compensation in the form of stock options and the amount of discretional
accruals. Other studies (Balsam, Mozes, & Newman, 2003; Bartov & Mohanram, 2004;
Bergstresser & Philippon, 2004; Burns & Kedia, 2003; Gao & Shrieves, 2002; Kadan
& Yang, 2005: Peng & Röell, 2004) find a positive correlation between the amount of
stock options and earnings management practices, especially those practices aimed at
manipulating discretional accruals opportunistically. These policies tend to increase
profits when managers exercise their options in order to increase any personal advantage
connected to the option exercise when share prices are high. In contrast, when stock
option plans are issued, these studies assume opposite earnings management practices.
Lower profits favor lower exercise prices, increasing those benefits of managers that
are related to the revaluation of share prices in future periods characterized by higher
profits. Additionally, empirical evidence shows that managers are more likely to engage
in earnings management when they hold a larger proportion of their compensation in
performance-vested stock options (Kuang, 2008).
With regard to the perceived cost hypothesis, few empirical studies consider the actual or
estimated impact that the application of IFRS 2 may have on the granting of SOPs in terms
of real earnings management, a practice that manipulates real business activities to manage
reported earnings (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005; Xu, Taylor, & Dugan, 2007). Street
and Cereola (2004) evaluate the quantitative impact of the standard and conclude that the
new accounting rule will change diluted EPS. Crasselt (2006) studies the impact of IFRS
2 by monitoring the evolution of share-based payments on a sample of German listed
firms, focusing on conflict among the different SOP motivations (accounting, fiscal, and
incentive). Empirical results indicate that after 2004 accounting reasons drive the design
of incentive plans to a lesser extent than in the past.
Even if they do not specifically address IFRS 2 adoption, the main results from recent US
literature seem relevant to understanding how fair value recognition of SOPs in P&Ls
affects the issuing of stock options. For example, SFAS 123R (the revised version of SFAS
123) and IFRS 2 converge toward P&L recognition of the fair value of equity instruments
granted during the vesting period. Further, even if differences about external environment,
institutional structures, and culture exist between the U.S. and Europe (Nobes, 1998), the
former has provided a good background for studying SOPs because these instruments
were a key feature of irrational exuberance during the bubble in the late 1990s.
More specifically, Carter, Lynch, and Tuna (2007) demonstrate that financial reporting
costs play a role in determining CEO compensation, reducing the use of options but
increasing the use of restricted stocks, without any reduction in overall CEO recompense.
In other words, these findings support the idea that it is difficult for firms to downsize
executive pay packages that result from prior favorable accounting treatment of SOPs.
Choudhary, Venkatachalam, and Rajgopal (2009) confirm that the recognition of stock
options in P&Ls plays a role in firms’ real actions. Specifically, they find that in anticipation
of SFAS 123R several firms accelerated the vesting of employee stock options to avoid
recognizing unvested stock options at fair value in the following financial statements.
Empirical evidence also confirms a real effect of SFAS 123R on the vesting terms of SOPs,
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supporting the idea that firms try to defer recognition of stock option expense (Cadman,
Rusticus, & Sunder, 2013)
However, opportunistic reporting on stock options (e.g., the use of volatility to underestimate
fair value cost) could be significantly limited by specific and exhaustive authoritative
guidance regarding fair value estimation (Choudhary, 2011). This result is interesting
because it seems to corroborate the idea that firms treat recognized and disclosure values
differently. Particularly, recognized values are more likely to be underestimated because
they are usually considered more reliable than disclosed items (Schipper, 2007).
A question remaining unanswered in the literature concerns the effect of the mandatory
adoption of IFRS 2 on the issuing of SOPs over an appropriate multi-year period. It should
be noted that the design of SOPs usually requires fixed option issues for more than one
year (e.g., in Italy, the average is three years) (Ramassa, 2006), and hence, a significant
effect might be observed only some years after first time adoption (FTA). This longer time
horizon also makes it possible to study the impact of the global financial crisis, which led
to mounting pressure on corporate executives, thus increasing the outrage costs of SOPs.
3. Development of hypotheses
Prior stock option literature generally acknowledges that the favorable accounting
treatment of SOPs played a large role in determining their widespread adoption (Hall &
Murphy, 2003; Murphy, 2002; Muurling & Lehnert, 2004). Some years after the mandatory
adoption of IFRS for European listed companies, the impact of IFRS 2 on the issuing of
SOPs can now be tested in terms of real earnings management. In line with the perceived
cost stream of research, it is logical to expect that the mandatory recognition of the
cost of SOPs reduced the adoption of this form of incentive. This leads to the following
hypothesis:
H1: After the mandatory adoption of IFRS 2, the probability of firms issuing SOPs
decreases.
Our expectations with regard to H1 are not straightforward. According to the literature,
the low visibility of SOPs because of previous accounting treatment is without doubt a
relevant benefit for granting stock options. This is particularly true for countries such as
Italy where no disclosure on option value was required before the adoption of IFRS 2.
Additionally, prior literature shows that the Italian context is characterized by a high degree
of earnings management practices (Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). These considerations
would imply a significant association with, and expectation of, a negative sign. However,
mixed evidence from the aforementioned streams of research may justify alternative
expectations. This is consistent with many scholars who argue that the motivations behind,
and determinants of, SOPs are not mutually exclusive and that there is not a perspective
that is able to single-handedly explain the widespread adoption of SOPs (Hall & Murphy,
2003).
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This line of reasoning suggests that change in accounting treatment may not be significant
because of a larger role played by other factors after the transition to IFRS 2.
The second hypothesis refers to the impact of the financial crisis on options. According
to Murphy (1999, 2002), stock-based compensation may increase during sustained bull
markets for two reasons. First, with many SOPs the number of shares to be granted is
determined on just one date and fixed for several years. Therefore, in periods of escalating
stock prices, the value of shares and options granted will increase relative to cash
compensation. Second, participants are more likely to accept stock-based pay instead of
cash during prolonged market upturns. As well as the aforementioned considerations,
it is worth noting that the financial crisis highlighted some cases of executives receiving
extremely high compensation despite poor corporate performance. This caused growing
criticism toward SOPs, increasing outrage costs connected to this kind of incentive.
Therefore, we expect a negative association between a financial crisis and the granting of
SOPs and suggest that:
H2: During a financial crisis, the probability of firms issuing SOPs decreases.
Because of the role played by many different determinants in explaining SOPs, we also
postulate and test three hypotheses relating to the major determinants explored by stock
option literature.
Thus, the third hypothesis concerns the incentive alignment perspective, with particular
regard to the association between growth opportunities and granting SOPs. It is assumed
that a firm’s need to align employee incentives with those of shareholders is associated
with stock option compensation. Consistent with previous studies (Ding & Sun, 2001;
Kedia & Mozumdar, 2002; Yermack, 1995), we hypothesize that firms with valuable growth
opportunities will grant incentives. This leads to our third hypothesis:
H3: The probability of firms issuing SOPs increases for firms with higher growth opportunities.
Firms facing financial constraints are expected to be more likely to grant options (Core
& Guay, 2001; Kedia & Mozumdar, 2002; Matsunaga, Shevlin, & Shores, 1992; Yermack,
1995). Therefore, for our fourth hypothesis we propose that:
H4: The probability of firms issuing SOPs increases for firms facing liquidity constraints.
Finally, taking into consideration Italian regulations, we test tax benefits, which until
2006 favored the personal income tax returns of plan participants, making this form of
incentive preferable to cash compensation. Therefore, our fifth hypothesis can be expressed
as follows:
H5: After restrictions on tax benefits for SOPs, the probability of firms issuing SOPs decreases.
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4. Research Design
4.1. Empirical Model and Variable Definitions
In order to verify the aforementioned hypotheses, we use a logistic regression model
(LOGIT). The model assumes the following relation between the proposed explanatory
variables and firms’ decisions to issue SOPs:
SO_ISSUEit = 1 / (1+e-Zit)
Zit = β0 + β1IFRS_2it + β2CRISISt + β3GROWTHit + β4OCFi + 			
β5TAXt + β6LOG_ASSETit + β7LEVERAGEit + β8ROAit +
β9REGULATEDi + β10MKT_INDEXt

(1)

where
SO_ISSUEit

=

dependent variable equal to 1 if the firm i issues stock options in year t, and 0
otherwise;

IFRS_2it

=

dummy variable codified 1 if firm i has financial statements prepared in
accordance with IFRS 2 (options’ value recognized as an expense) in year t, and 0
otherwise;

CRISISt

=

dummy variable codified 1 if the year t is a year of financial crisis (2009), and 0
otherwise;

GROWTHit

=

proxy for the presence of growth opportunities. For firm i in year t the calculation
is made by adding together the book value of assets and the difference between
the market and book values of common stock, and dividing the total by the book
value of assets (approximation of Tobin’s q);

OCFi

=

cash flow from operations for firm i in year t;

TAXt

=

dummy variable equal to 0 if in the year t there are tax incentives for issuing stock
options in favor of the employee (2000-2006), and 1 otherwise;

LOG_ASSETit

=

log of the total assets for firm i in year t;

LEVERAGEit

=

total debt divided by total equity for firm i in year t;

ROAit

=

return on assets for firm i in year t;

REGULATEDi

=

dummy variable codified 1 if firm i operates in a regulated industry, and 0
otherwise. We identify the utilities, banking, and insurance industries as heavily
regulated;

MKT_INDEXt

=

market index (FTSE Italia All-Share) of the Milan Stock Exchange at the end of the
year t;

εi

=

error term.

With regard to our proxy for crisis, it is useful to underline that the negative effects of
the global financial crisis on the real economy did not peak at the same time around the
world. Because our study focuses on Italy, we use 2009 as the year in which the impact
of the crisis on the real economy became evident. This is supported by the main indexes,
which exhibited negative signs starting from the last quarter of 2008 and progressively

85

F. Avallone | THE EFFECTS OF ACCOUNTING TREATMENT AND FINANCIAL CRISIS ...

worsened in 2009 (e.g., 2009 nominal GDP was equal to -5%, the industrial production
index was -18%, and private consumption growth was -1.8%).
Consistent with Smith and Watts (1992) and Yermack (1995), our proxy that captures
firm growth opportunities is an approximation of the ratio of market-to-book values of
firm assets. For this purpose, we define a variable approximately equal to Tobin’s q by
adding together the book value of assets and the difference between the market and book
values of common stock, and dividing the total by the book value of assets.
In line with prior literature, we control for the five variables that we believe affect the
decision to issue stock options by including them as independent variables in the model.
Three variables enable us to include some firm characteristics in the analysis (size, profitability, and financial sources). Another variable summarizes exogenous factors, such as
stock market performance, which could be important determinants for decision-making
because of the market-based nature of stock options.
Lastly, as in prior literature (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Smith & Watts, 1992) we conjecture
that managers in highly regulated industries will receive lower stock option incentives because of the reduced range of managerial discretion. Thus, we identify three highly regulated industries: banking, insurance, and public utilities (Bizjak, Brickley, & Coles, 1993).
Table 1 presents the proxies used for independent variables and the predicted sign of
each relationship between covariates and the decision to issue stock options.
Table 1: Proxies and predicted signs for explanatory variables
(the variables are grouped according to the main hypotheses).
Hypotheses

Predicted sign Proxies

1) Mandatory adoption of IFRS2

(H1)

-

2) Financial crisis

(H2)

-

3) Incentive alignment

(H3)

+

4) Liquidity constraints

(H4)

-

5) Tax benefits

(H5)

-

6) Control variables:
Firm size
Leverage
Firm’s profitability
Regulated industries
Stock market performance

Dummy variable (0 = Italian
GAAP, 1 = IFRS 2)
Dummy variable (1 = year of
financial crisis in Italy: 2009)
Approximately equal to
Tobin’s q
Operating cash flow
Dummy variable (1 = years 20072009; 0 = years 2000-2006)
Log of total assets
Debt-equity ratio
Return on assets
Dummy variable (1 = regulated
industries: banking, insurance,
and utilities)
FTSE Italia All-Share

Explanatory
variables
IFRS_2
CRISIS
GROWTH
OCF
TAX
LOG_ASSET
LEVERAGE
ROA
REGULATED
MKT_INDEX
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4.2. Sample and data
The hypotheses are tested on the entire population of Italian listed companies during
the period 2000-2009. From this population, we only exclude foreign firms to ensure
homogeneity in accounting standards. Consequently, in our sample there are no firms
adopting IFRS 2 on a voluntary basis before 2005. Consistent with prior research, we
exclude firm-year observations that do not have sufficient data to compute the variables
needed to estimate the model. Collectively, these filters yield a sample of 1,616 firm-year
observations.
In order to obtain data for our analysis we relied on Capital IQ, a database provided
by Standard and Poor’s market and accounting data drawn from corporate financial
statements. This source provides data for which we need to define both explanatory and
control variables. Non-accounting data consist of the approximation of Tobin’s q and stock
market performance. Accounting data include operating cash flow, total assets, leverage,
and return on assets. Both market and accounting data refer to the end of each fiscal year
investigated (2000-2009).
5. Analysis of Results
5.1. Summary statistics
Because our sample (N = 1,616) has outlying observations in most of the explanatory
variables, we remove them from the analysis. We isolate outliers by means of the simple
three-sigma rule (Barnett and Lewis, 1994), thus isolating companies that have:
 x - µ(x)  ≥3 σ(x)				

(2)

where
σ(x) is the standard deviation of the variable (x).
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the full sample investigated (N = 1,555) after
the outlying observation exclusion. As expected, when comparing mean and standard
deviation with the minimum and maximum values, Table 2 seems to reveal the absence of
outlying observations. It should be noted that only three variables, Tobin’s q (GROWTH),
the operating cash flow (OCF), and the debt-equity ratio (LEVERAGE) could give rise to
outlying observations implied by the values in the 'Maximum' column of the table. These
values, however, do not justify further exclusion.
With respect to the growth opportunities variable (GROWTH), it is interesting to note
that 75% of the firms in our sample have limited growth opportunities (see the value of
q1). It would be worth analyzing whether the remaining 25% of firms with high-growth
opportunities are those that usually issue stock option plans. Additionally, regarding the

87

F. Avallone | THE EFFECTS OF ACCOUNTING TREATMENT AND FINANCIAL CRISIS ...

leverage variable (LEVERAGE), Table 2 reveals that 75% of our sample’s firms have a
considerable proportion between debt and equity (debt-equity ratio with values around 1)
even if the remaining 25% might also have a high level of total indebtedness (maximum
value equal to 13.11).
Table 2: Summary statistics of explanatory variables (N = 1,555)
Variable
Explanatory variables:
IFRS_2
CRISIS
GROWTH
OCF
TAX
Control variables:
LOG_ASSET
LEVERAGE
ROA
REGULATED
MKT_INDEX

Mean

Std. dev.

Minimum

q1

Median

q3

Maximum

.634
.139
1.278
357.508
.406

.4817
.346
.562
1,721.839
.491

0
0
.045
-17,987
0

0
0
.964
1.863
0

1
0
1.129
18.367
1

1
1
1.416
117.702
1

1
0
7.654
22,720
0

6.405
1.035
2.838
.135
-.049

1.872
1.215
4.375
.342
.230

2.368
1.00e-06
-13.232
0
-.423

5.046
.340
.635
0
-.217

6.044
.759
2.890
0
-.105

7.561
1.288
5.212
1
.158

12.350
13.116
18.697
1
.243

IFRS_2 = IFRS 2 adoption (dummy variable); CRISIS = year of financial crisis in Italy (dummy variable);
GROWTH = approximately equal to Tobin’s q; TAX = year of fiscal incentive for stock option in Italy (dummy
variable); LOG_ASSET = log of total assets; LEVERAGE = debt-equity ratio; ROA = return on assets; REGULATED = regulated industries (dummy variable); MKT_INDEX = stock market performance (FTSE Italia
All-Share).

5.2. Multivariate analysis
Before proceeding to the regression results, we analyze the Spearman (rank) correlation
coefﬁcients for variables (Table 3). With reference to the dependent variable (SO_ISSUE),
Table 3 shows a significant association between the decision to issue stock options and three
explanatory variables: crisis, growth, and operating cash flow. As suggested by the literature,
since SOPs offer companies a method for saving cash (stock options represent ”cashless”
compensation), the lower the operating cash flow generated in the year, the higher the
probability of issuing stock options. In this case, however, the positive association does not
support traditional expectations. Nonetheless, the signs for the other two variables seem
to support stock option literature. With reference to our measure of growth, the positive
association reveals that in companies with large growth opportunities, the use of marketbased pay mechanisms could be useful in order to introduce an incentive alignment
between managers and shareholders. Further, the negative association between periods of
financial crisis and stock option issues seems to reveal that the potential excessive benefits
related to these market-based pay mechanisms could be reduced during a crisis. Finally,
the control variable reveals that the stock option issue seems to be positively associated
with firm size and performance.
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With reference to independent variables, Table 3 shows that some statistically significant
correlation exists. The relative weakness in the correlation coefﬁcients for these variables
suggests that multicollinearity is not likely to be a signiﬁcant issue in the multivariate
analysis. The Pearson correlation (untabulated) shows similar results, validating the
robustness of the aforementioned results.
Table 3: Spearman (rank) correlation matrix
Variables
SO_ISSUE
IFRS_2

SO_
ISSUE

IFRS_2

GROWTH

0.151***

OCF

0.211*** -0.066***

REGULATED
MKT_INDEX

LOG_
ASSET

LEVERAGE

ROA

REGU- MKT_
LATED INDEX

1

0.005 -0.140***
-0.027

1
0.110***

1

-0.015 0.627*** 0.487*** -0.176*** -0.060***

LOG_ASSET 0.229***
ROA

TAX

1

-0.052** 0.305***

LEVERAGE

OCF

1
0.007

CRISIS

TAX

CRISIS GROWTH

-0.001

-0.010 -0.074*** 0.703***

0.023 0.067*** 0.067***

-0.054**

0.009

0.009 -0.129*** 0.160***

0.042* -0.604*** -0.604*** 0.276***

1

0.003 0.086*** 0.202***

0.177*** -0.120*** -0.120*** 0.408*** 0.437***
0.010

1
0.000

1

-0.045* 0.224*** -0.145***
0.026 0.252***

0.018 -0.389***

1

0.011 -0.063***

1

0.025 -0.054** 0.141*** -0.003

1

This table provides the Spearman (rank) correlation matrix for explanatory and dependent variables. Values
indicated in bold show statistically signiﬁcant relationships between variables. ∗, ∗ ∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical signiﬁcance at less than 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively (two-tailed). Pearson correlation shows
similar results.
SO_ISSUE = stock option issues (dummy variable); IFRS_2 = IFRS 2 adoption (dummy variable); CRISIS =
year of financial crisis in Italy (dummy variable); GROWTH = approximately equal to Tobin’s q; TAX = year
of fiscal incentive for stock options in Italy (dummy variable); LOG_ASSET = log of total assets; LEVERAGE = debt-equity ratio; ROA = return on assets; REGULATED = regulated industries (dummy variable);
MKT_INDEX = stock market performance (FTSE Italia All-Share).

Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regression. As already shown in the univariate
analyses, the regression coefficients for two explanatory variables (CRISIS and GROWTH)
are statistically significant at less than 5% and 1% levels respectively, with signs that
support our hypotheses. Specifically, the estimate for the former dummy variable (CRISIS,
significant at a .02 level) reveals that the probability of issuing stock options decreases
during periods of financial crisis (H2). In order to interpret the possible effect of the
dependent variables on the probability of issuing stock options, we take into account the
transformation of the regression coefficients (odds ratios).
Since our variable (CRISIS) denotes the presence (1) or the absence (0) of financial crisis
in year t, the odds ratio equal to 0.25 indicates that the relative probability of a firm
choosing to issue stock options decreases by 75% in years of financial crisis. This result
supports the predicted negative association (H2), confirming that during a financial crisis
firms are less likely to grant stock options. Such a finding is consistent with the reduced
incentive (Murphy, 1999; 2002) and heightened outrage costs associated with this kind of
compensation, as confirmed by anecdotal evidence.
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With reference to the other variable (GROWTH, significant at a .000 level), the value
and sign of the coefficient reveal that the higher a firm’s growth opportunities, the higher
the probability of issuing stock options. Because of the variable’s unit of measure, the
interpretation of odds ratios for Tobin’s q is not very enlightening. It is more relevant to
look at the marginal effect of a firm’s growth opportunities on its decision to issue SOPs.
In particular, a mean 1% change in Tobin’s q is associated with a 1.7% increase in the
probability of granting an SOP.
With reference to control variables, Table 4 shows that a firm’s size (LOG_ASSET) is
positively associated with the decision to issue stock options, significant at a .000 level.
This result agrees with the findings of prior stock option literature. Further, in the U.S.
context, empirical evidence from prior studies shows that firm size is positively associated
with the voluntary recognition of the costs of SOPs. This is in line with our results and
suggests that IFRS 2 did not have a relevant impact on the issuing of SOPs because larger
firms (which are more likely to adopt SOPs) are less affected by the mandatory recognition
of stock option costs.
The other control variables included in the model are not significant at conventional levels.
This suggests that they are not relevant determinants in the decision to issue SOPs.
These results, taken together, support the following considerations of our main hypotheses:
(i) IFRS 2’s introduction has not induced a reduction in the use of SOPs (H1); and (ii) the
issue of stock options is much more likely in years without a financial crisis than in years
with a financial crisis (H2). With regard to the three hypotheses relating to the major
determinants explored by stock option literature, only H3 seems to be confirmed by
empirical results, suggesting that the probability of issuing SOPs is higher for firms with
better growth opportunities. Estimates do not show that liquidity constraints (H4) and tax
benefits (H5) have a significant impact on the granting of SOPs.
Table 4 Panel A indicates the model’s goodness of fit for explaining the issuing of SOPs,
with a likelihood-ratio chi-squared significance at less than .000, a hit rate of 94.92%, a
McFadden pseudo-R2 of .2585, and a Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 of .298 (untabulated). The
model’s goodness of fit should be considered, bearing in mind not only the fact that
pseudo-R2 should not be confused with R2 for OLS regression, but also that it is often a
small value.
In order to deal with concerns about a failure to meet assumptions, we regress logit,
estimating the standard errors clustered by firm (Petersen, 2009). Consistent with our
univariate results, collinearity diagnostics do not highlight issues for the independent
variables, with variance inflation factors (VIFs) lower than 2.5. To check the stability
of our results, we re-test our model using alternative proxies for covariates. Estimates
(untabulated) do not substantially differ after these robustness checks.
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Table 4: Logistic regression results
Panel A – Model summary - goodness of fit
Number of obs.
Wald chi2 (10)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Log-likelihood = -233.790

=
=
=
=

1,555
86.01
0.000
0.258

Panel B – Estimated coefficients
LOGIT

Variable

Explanatory variables
IFRS_2
CRISIS
GROWTH
OCF
TAX
Control variables
LOG_ASSET
LEVERAGE
ROA
REGULATED
MKT_INDEX
constant

Hypothesis
(H1)
(H2)
(H3)
(H4)
(H5)

Predicted
sign

Coeff.

Std.
err.

z

P>|z|

+
-

.560
-1.374**
.908***
.000
-.014

.361
.592
.342
.000
.333

1.55
-2.32
2.66
0.18
-0.04

0.121
0.020
0.008
0.854
0.967

-.148
-2.534
.238
-.000
-.667

1.268
-.2148
1.578
.000
.6396

.681***
.010
.099
-.462
-1.137
-9.908

.109
.192
.086
.613
.696
.957

6.27
0.05
1.15
-0.75
-1.63
-10.35

0.000
0.960
0.249
0.452
0.103
0.000

.468
-.366
-.069
-1.662
-2.501
-11.784

.893
.385
.267
.741
.229
-8.032

[95% conf.
interval]

This table shows coefficients from logistic regression (LOGIT), with standard errors clustered by firm. We illustrate Wald Statistics, Log Likelihood and McFadden pseudo-R 2. *,**, and *** indicate significance at less than
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. IFRS_2 = IFRS 2 adoption (dummy variable); CRISIS = year of financial
crisis in Italy (dummy variable); GROWTH = approximately equal to Tobin’s q; TAX = year of fiscal incentive for stock options in Italy (dummy variable); LOG_ASSET = log of total assets; LEVERAGE = debt-equity
ratio; ROA = return on assets; REGULATED = regulated industries (dummy variable); MKT_INDEX = stock
market performance (FTSE Italia AllShare).

6. Conclusions
In the last few decades, many studies have explored corporate and external determinants of
the granting of SOPs to employees, providing mixed evidence that has supported different
explanations for this phenomenon.
Our study aimed to explore the impact of two recent events: the mandatory recognition
of SOPs imposed by IFRS 2 and the recent financial crisis. These two external factors were
expected to have a significant impact on corporate compensation policies. With regard to
IFRS 2, studies proposing a perceived cost view, and the intense lobbying activity against
the standard, suggest that a less favorable accounting treatment (the cost recognition of
SOPs) could affect the use of SOPs, with a significant reduction in the number of firms
issuing options. The financial crisis was also expected to have a negative impact on SOPs
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because of political and outrage costs. These increased when the crisis started to affect the
real economy.
A number of benefits and advantages are associated with stock options in prior literature
(Muurling & Lehnert, 2004). We tested the impact of these further by taking into
consideration the traditional SOP determinants. In particular, we tested minor hypotheses
regarding the incentive alignment view and the roles of liquidity constraints and tax
benefits.
Thus, we ran a logit regression, adopting the granting of stock options to employees in a
specific year (0/1) as a dependent variable. As covariates, we used five variables from our
hypotheses (IFRS 2 mandatory adoption, financial crisis, growth opportunities, liquidity
constraints, and tax benefits) and controlled for size, leverage, profitability, industry, and
stock market performance.
Contrary to the considerable emphasis placed by previous studies on the accounting
treatment of SOPs, our work indicates that the increased transparency provided by the
mandatory adoption of IFRS 2 (H1) did not result in firms issuing fewer SOPs. It is
relevant to point out that our results are obtained over a five-year period after first time
adoption (FTA), and hence, they are not limited to the immediate effect of IFRS 2, an effect
that could be misleading because of the multi-year design of SOPs. This interpretation
is consistent with prior literature because it claims that a specific benefit cannot singlehandedly explain corporate behavior and that the influence of different advantages can
change over time.
With reference to H2, our findings match Murphy’s (2002) and lend empirical support
to the observation that a financial crisis reduces the probability of firms issuing stock
options. We interpret the results as evidence in support of the idea that a financial crisis
not only affects the incentive power of SOPs, but could also increase outrage costs. These
two factors seem to be major barriers against the issuing of SOPs. This is not surprising
and can be seen as a reaction to growing criticism toward SOPs prompted by cases of
executives receiving extremely high compensation despite poor corporate performance.
Consistent with our predictions, growth opportunities (H3) seem to influence the decision
to issue SOPs, increasing the probability of using stock-based compensation. This matches
the incentive alignment view and is also consistent with the idea that SOPs are adopted
when their incentive power is higher, a proposal confirmed by the fall in firms issuing
options because of the financial crisis. In contrast, empirical evidence does not support
H4 and H5, suggesting that financial constraints and tax benefits are less significant in
explaining corporate practices.
Our work has both theoretical and policy implications. First, it contributes to the stock
option literature by suggesting that the recent financial crisis has played a role in reducing
the number of SOPs issued. This could be explained by increased outrage costs related
to this kind of compensation. Our findings also support the idea that the mandatory

92

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW | VOL. 16 | No. 1 | 2014

introduction of IFRS 2 has not induced a reduction in the use of SOPs, contrary to
expectations deriving from the perceived cost view. In this context, the present study
also contributes to existing research on the impact of IFRS 2 and has important policy
implications about the real effect produced by the increased transparency of SOPs. Finally,
unlike most IFRS literature, our interest is not in market reactions or earnings quality,
but in the real effect on firms’ behavior. This is extremely relevant from a standard setting
point of view.
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